Ptak Science Books

On the Atomic Bomb: 16 July-9 August, 1945

I've made a number of posts recently relating to the building of and the decision to use the atomic bomb, from the Trinity Test to the Nagasaki bomb, 16 July-9 August, as we are in that time of year when all of this happened, 63 years ago.  To look at all of these post, click here.  Beginning on 6th August I will begin posting a series of 38 documents  (written in 1945 and early 1946) from the Vannevar Bush group tasked with the problem of  the coming proliferation of atomic weapons.  As far as I can determine NONE of these documents have ever been published. The first of these papers to be presented is by William Shockley (nobelist and highly problematic late-life thinker) on the Economics of the Atomic Bomb (1945).

Atomic Bomb--the Cautionary Letters of Einstein and Szilard, 1939-1945

JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 189

Einstein's Letters of 1939 and 1945; Szilard's Petition of 1945; Groves' Letter to Cherwell Looking for Dirt on Szilard 1945; Cherwell's Unusual Response, 1945

AND

JR Oppenheimer signs off on the military use of the bomb

There were certainly a number of cautionary flags waved at the Executive Branch in the period just before the atomic bomb was first used against a Japanese target.  As I wrote in an earlier post here, Dwight Eisenhower was adamantly opposed to the use of the bomb on a city, preferring an example to be made of the thing on an unpopulated area; in his memoirs, General Spaatz (who had received the only written communication authorizing the use of the bomb) was privately against using the weapon on a city. As early as 1939 Albert Einstein famously communicated with Franklin Roosevelt his concerns on the possibility of the terrifying nature of a bomb produced by the efforts (of Fermi and Szilard and many others).  In all Einstein wrote four letters to the President, the first and fourth of which we reproduce here.

The First Einstein Letter to Roosevelt, 1939

                                                                                                   

Einstein's (Fourth) letter to Franklin Roosevelt, introducing Leo Szilard (with his letter following, below):

Albert Einstein
112 Mercer Street
Princeton, New Jersey

March 25, 1945

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I am writing you to introduce Dr. L. Szilard who proposes to submit to you certain considerations and recommendations. Unusual circumstances which I shall describe further below induce me to take this action in spite of the fact that I do not know the substance of the considerations and recommendations which Dr. Szilard proposes to submit to you.

In the summer of 1939 Dr. Szilard put before me his views concerning the potential importance of uranium for national defense. He was greatly disturbed by the potentialities involved and anxious that the United States Government be advised of them as soon as possible. Dr. Szilard, who is one of the discovers of the neutron emission of uranium on which all present work on uranium is based, described to me a specific system which he devised and which he thought would make it possible to set up a chain reaction in unseparated uranium in the immediate future. Having known him for over twenty years both for his scientific work and personally, I have much confidence in his judgment and it was on the basis of his judgment as well as my own that I took the liberty to approach you in connection with this subject. You responded to my letter dated August 2, 1939 by the appointment of a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Briggs and thus started the Government's activity in this field.

The terms of secrecy under which Dr. Szilard is working at present do not permit him to give me information about his work; however, I understand that he now is greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy. In the circumstances I consider it my duty to give Dr. Szilard this introduction and I wish to express the hope that you will be able to give his presentation of the case your personal attention.
(Signed A. Eisntein)

The Leo Szilard Petition, with the full text below:

On July 17, 1945, Leo Szilard and 69 co-signers at the Manhattan Project Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago signed a petition (written by Szilard) to President Roosevelt, calling on the powers that be to reconsider using the bomb against a city target  not only on moral grounds but also as a template for what the near-future would bring so far as the proliferation of the bomb was concerned.  It seems that they were saying that the use of the bomb in July 1945 would make it more plausible for the use of far more destructive bombs in the coming years. ("If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation.")  They continued "All the resources of the United States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation. Its prevention is at present the solemn responsibility of the United States -- singled out by virtue of her lead in the field of atomic power...", certainly warning the President of the pandora aspect of the employment of Fat Man

In general the group was against using the weapon--except if it were absolutely necessary "(in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs"): "...then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step, however, ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved." This is the tricky spot, the balancing point, of the entire discussion on whether to drop the bomb--was using the bomb, (in "certain circumstances") a necessity?

General Groves, the military man in charge of Los Alamos, was hugely annoyed, piss-and-vinegar upset with Szilard over this communication--outraged that Szilard, in his mind, had broken security measures to communicate his concerns with the President.  Groves sought out Lord Cherwell  to do some dirt-digging on Szilard, looking for ways of dealing with his "insubordination".

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 1 PAGE(S)
NO. 3 OF 3 COPIES, SERIES A

                                         4 July 1945
The Right Honorable
The Lord Cherwell
War Cabinet Offices
London, England

Dear Lord Cherwell,

I wonder if it would be taxing your memory unduly if I were to ask
you to write me briefly the subjects of your discussion in your
meeting with Dr. Leo Szilard in May of 1943, when you were in this
country.

Dr. Szilard, as you will recall, worked in the Clarendon Laboratory
during the years 1935 to 1938.

Frankly, Dr. Szilard has not, in our opinion, evidenced wholehearted
cooperation in the maintenance of security.

In order to prevent any unjustified action, I am examining all of
the facts which can be collected on Dr. Szilard and I am therefore
seeking your assistance.

I am looking forward to the day when I will be able to see you again.

                                           Sincerely yours,

                                           L. R. GROVES
                                           Major General, USA

Cherwel's response to groves was very interesting--he included with it a Top Secret document recounting his overall impressions of Szilard (in regards to a security detriment) which is below.  As you can see Cherwell's own recllection from 1943 would provide no fuel for Grove's fire--Szilard was meticulous on these points, choosing his words wisely (he was, after all, a genius).  The only thing that Cherwell could actually say against Szilard was that he kept harking back to his general anxiety about the future of the world".  Indeed!

  SECRET
                        TOP SECRET

PAYMASTER GENERAL                        GREAT GEORGE STREET,
                                                       S.W.1


    CONVERSATION WITH DR. SZILARD, MAY 1943, WASHINGTON D.C.

When I spoke to Szilard in Washington in 1943, he was, so far as I
can remember, mainly concerned with a topic which has inflamed so
many scientists' minds, namely what sort of arrangements could be
made to prevent an arms race with all the disastrous consequences to
which this would lead. I do not recall that he offered any solution,
although when we had discussed the same matter in Oxford before the
war he had advocated some agreement between scientists not to lend
themselves to any application of nuclear chain reactions to lethal
purposes.

My impression is that his security was good to the point of
brusqueness. He did, I believe, complain that compartmentalism was
carried to undue lengths in America, but on the other hand, when I
asked him about some point - I forget what - deriving from our work
in Oxford he replied that he was not at liberty to discuss it as he
had passed into the employment of the American Government. We did
not, so far as I can recollect, have any further conversation on
technical processes, but he kept harking back to his general anxiety
about the future of the world.

                                            Cherwell   

Oppenheimer

Finally for this installment is the recommendation by JR Oppenheimer on the military use of the bomb ("we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."), a text transcript of the document as follows:

Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, by the Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee on Nuclear Power, June 16, 1945. Source: U. S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, Harrison-Bundy File, Folder #76.

TOP SECRET
THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec Army By TAG per 720564
THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGE(S)
NO. 1 OF 12 COPIES, SERIES A
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE IMMEDIATE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

                        A. H. Compton
                        E. O. Lawrence
                        J. R. Oppenheimer
                        E. Fermi

                                  [signature]
                                  J. R. Oppenheimer
                                  For the Panel

June 16, 1945

You have asked us to comment on the initial use of the new weapon. This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a satisfactory adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war.

(1) To accomplish these ends we recommend that before the weapons are used not only Britain, but also Russia, France, and China be advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on atomic weapons, that these may be ready to use during the present war, and that we would welcome suggestions as to how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations.

(2) The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.

(3) With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power.

Atomic Bomb, 1 August 1945: Stimson on the Publication of the Smyth Report

JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 188

Secretary of War Henry Stimson's Diary Entry for 1 August 1945, centering on the publication of Henry DeWolf Smyth's history of the Manhattan Project (bold is by me as are any statements made between [ ] ):

August 1, 1945
"As soon as I arrived at the Department I called in General Marshall and asked him whether he had received my message through McCarthy and he told me that he had and that the speech had been changed and made in an entirely different form."

"I then took up with Harrison, Bundy and Groves the third paper to be issued in S-1, namely that of the scientists.  The draft of this paper [Henry DeWolf Smyth’s A general account of the development of methods of using atomic energy for military purposes, which would be known later in the year as  Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, 1945, and then more generally and unofficially as the Smyth Report]  is about two hundred pages long - manifestly so big that I cannot possibly read it now, and I therefore went over the skeleton of it and the pros and cons of making any speech (as to which I am very doubtful) with my three consultants. The aim of the paper is to backfire reckless statements by independent scientists after the demonstration of the bomb. If we could be sure that these could be controlled and avoided, all of us would much prefer not to issue such a paper. But under the circumstances of the entire independence of action of scientists and the certainty that there would be a tremendous amount of excitement and reckless statement, Groves, who is a very conservative man, had reached the conclusion that the lesser evil would be for us to make a statement carefully prepared so as not to give away anything vital and thus try to take the stage away from the others. We debated long over the situation for it is a very difficult question and all of us recognize its difficulty. Rules have been drawn under which this present paper has been formulated. I went over those rules and then postponed the matter until tomorrow when I shall have a talk with Conant, Groves, Bundy, and some of Groves' assistants on the whole matter. I am of course much influenced by the fact that Groves has reached a decision in favor of the statement."

(General Groves I believe recognized the expediency of the report as well in spite of his expectedly ferocious adherence to security protocol—the report, while revealing a lot of data, would also establish the limit of publication of information on the Project and on the bomb.  Overall, it was a smart thing to do, establishing the control of the dialog on the subject of the bomb. It was after all Groves (in 1944) who appointed Smyth to the Richard C. Tolman Committee to make recommendations for the post-war development of atomic energy; Smyth recommended publishing a report on the making of the bomb that would be published soon after it was no longer a secret; Groves concurred.  The report was officially released (in 160,000 copies) on 12 August 1945.)

S-1 Executive Committee, Manhattan Project,
September 14, 1942
l. to r.: Thomas Crenshaw, Robert Oppenheimer, Harold C. Urey, Ernest O. Lawrence, James B. Conant, Lyman J. Briggs, E. V. Murphree, Arthur Compton,  Robert Thornton,  K. D. Nichols.

Picture at top is of Smyth with what looks like the advance copy (the famous "lithoprint" edition).

Following are the opening paragraphs of the Smyth report from the Preface and Introduction: 

Preface

"The ultimate responsibility for our nation's policy rests on its citizens and they can discharge such responsibilities wisely only if they are informed. The average citizen cannot be expected to understand clearly how an atomic bomb is constructed or how it works but there is in this country a substantial group of engineers and scientists who can understand such things and who can explain their potentialities of atomic bombs to their fellow citizens. The present report is written for this professional group and is a matter-of-fact, general account of work in the USA since 1939 aimed at the production of such bombs. It is neither a documented official history nor a technical treatise for experts. Secrecy requirements have affected both the detailed content and general emphasis so that many interesting developments have been omitted..."

First Paragraph of the Introduction:

"1.1. The purpose of this report is to describe the scientific and technical developments in this country since 1940 directed toward the military use of energy from atomic nuclei. Although not written as a "popular" account of the subject, this report is intended to be intelligible to scientists and engineers generally and to other college graduates with a good grounding in physics and chemistry. The equivalence of mass and energy is chosen as the guiding principle in the presentation of the background material of the "Introduction.""

The full text of the report is located HERE.

 

The Atomic Bomb: the Only Order to Actually Use Nuclear Weapons, 25 July 1945

JF Ptak Science Books LLC 

Here are the two basic documents which prepared the actual use of atomic weapons against Japanese targets (written 22 July and 25 July, respectively).    The first was prepared by Colonel John Stone for his superior General of the Army Air Forces Henry H. Hap Arnold, initiated by General George Marshall through General Thomas Handy—updating Arnold on the progress at the Potsdam Conference from which he (Stone)  had just returned.  The next is the only actual signed-off document authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and comes under the direction of George Marshall’s directive to General Handy:  basically relating that the P{resident had authorized Secretary Stimson who had authorized Marshall to authorize Handy to authorize General Carl Spaatz (Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Air Force) to use the weapon. Spaatz is also directed to deliver a copy of the order (“personally”, that is, by hand)  to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.
Source: The National Security Archive

The Atomic Bomb: 6 August 1945. Propaganda Leaflet Dropped on Japanese Cities

JF Ptak Science Books  LLC  Post 186

These are translations of leaflets that were dropped on Japanese cities in the immediate aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima (as Nagasaki, which would be bombed three days later on 9 August is not mentioned). Both of these are again from the Harry Truman Presidential Library.  The Japanese did not submit to the demand of unconditional surrender as laid out in Potsdam on 26 July, not did they submit when the Soviet Union declare war, nor did they submit after the 9 August bombing of Nagasaki.  They did finally accept the conditions of unconditional surrender surrender on 15 August, signing away the war two weeks later on the USS Missouri, 2 September 1945.  A third atomic bomb was nearly ready for use by the middle of August.   

The Atomic Bomb, 31 July 1945: Truman's Statement on the Bombing of Hiroshima

JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 185

I've made several posts on the development of the first atomic bomb(s) as we approach the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August 1945).  At this point in 1945, the Potsdam Declaration had been announced demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan, Little Boy was being assembled, and Fat Man had arrived at Tinian Island.  The last bits of the Manhattan Project were being put into place.  One of public relations parts—the first PR involving the use of the bomb--is a document that I’ve never seen before, found at the Truman Presidential Library (and available digitally). 
Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, sent this message to President Truman as the statement to be released by the White House once the (secret) bomb had been dropped (also known as “Use Day”)—an explanation to the American people about what would happen on 6 August.

The Transformation of Animals into Man--Peter Camper's Bad Idea of 1778

JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 184

Peter Camper (1722-1789) was educated by some of the most gifted minds of the mid-18th century (and standard, daily-occurrence names in the history of science) including  Willem Jacob 's Gravesande (1688-1742) and Herman Boerhaave.  Camper made very substantial contributions during a long and varied career (as an anatomist, anthropologist, naturalist, paleontologist) one of which., perhaps, was the originated of the idea and practice of the study of comparative anatomy.  He was very highly gifted, talented, capable, insightful; he was an excellent observer, and was also an able and capable researcher.   

Unfortunately there were some stumbles along the way, or at least which look to me like stumbles; some minor, some great. 
The relatively minor one is exhibited here, to the left--to me, this seems like a "what in the name of sweet holy Neptune is going on here?' category member.   It occurs in his  On the Points of Similarity between the Human Species, Quadrupeds, Birds, and Fish; with Rules for Drawing, founded on this Similarity (1778), and in general is an attempt at localizing, generalizing the study of anatomy, making it understandable in what seems to be multi-dimensional ways—or at least in ways that I cannot frankly understand.  In this image he tries to show the similarities in the bodies of the horse and wo/man, transforming the horse into a woman by virtue of a tremendous range of allowances:  dropping the hip of the horse, straightening the horse’s back, standing it upright, shortening and straightening the legs, shallowing the chest, losing the tail, straightening and shortening the neck, and so on and on…until, voila, a woman is made, showing the basic samenesses in all mammals.  I think that you could also work this magic with a (green, four door) 1960 Rambler—perhaps not, and perhaps this is no doubt a cheap shot, but the engraving, the image, is just so incredible I really don’t know what to do with it. 

His greater, post-creation stumble is one that he is probably best known for today—the facial angle.  Ever more so than the transformation angles, the facial angle found its way into repugnant uses in the “scientific" racialist circles—it was a study of the so-called progress of nature exemplified in the visual rise of the slope in the profile of man and beast, the slope of the profile from the top of the lip to the forehead.  It was a geometry of dominance employed by the dominant race against those who were different—the more “backward” the angle between the lip and forehead leaned, the closer to the baser breads and the animals one was.  As a matter of fact Camper uses a progression of eight profiles to delineate changes between simian and the “ideal” man (?), the assertion being that the greater the angle of regression the greater the closeness was to the monkey.  In Johann Caspar Lavater, perhaps the best known of the physiognomists, would publish a 24-profile version of Camper’s idea, showing the progression from frog to Apollo (?!).  Scientific fallacies such as these would be investigated and employed with increasing venom over the 15 decades—they are largely gone now as junk science, but they still exist as mis-remembered proof in some racial thought.  It would seem as though Camper's work in this theory of types (yes he was an influence on Goethe) gave much of this thought scientific credence. 

Blank People, Moonmen, and the John Herschel Hoax of 1835

JF Ptak Science Books LLC Post 183

In what seems to be a continuing post on the idea of blank people (I’ve posted on them twice before, here and here), that is to say, images of people with almost no attributes, people waiting to be “drawn in” or “filled up”, or completed in some way.  The image that I saved today is from William Hogarth,  whose witty attempt in displaying the hoaxing reports of life on the Moon depicts empty Moonpeople, "revealed during an eclipse, thanks to a powerful telescope, and faithfully reproduced afterwards".  Machines and instruments during this time seemed to have improved much quicker than the fictional and fantastical thinking that may have used them--even so Umberto Eco, who I think misses this point, wrote that, in this particular case, the telescope "had not pout an end to fantasy....but it has often deprived it of discernment and moral commitment, reducing it to an ingenious and neurotic form of futuristic anticipation".  (This is From Eco's first book, printed in 1963 (!), The Picture History of Invention, written with G.B. Zorzoli.  In spite of its tragic title, the writing and appreciation of invention is very good.) 

In a great prank/hoax of the 19th century, it was reported in 1835 that Sir John Herschel (son of a hugely important astronomer, Sir William, and who was of great importance in his own removed right) found some sort of living, humanoid-like beings alive, and seemingly thriving, on the Moon.  He did this with a 24-foot (diameter!!) telescope that “cost three hundred thousand dollars”, an amount funded by the King.  The whole thing was moved to the observatory at the Cape of Good Hope, where the discoveries were made.  Sir John was of course quite surprised to hear of his discoveries, though I'm sure he would’ve been happy to get his hands on the telescope, which would’ve been the largest in the world, by far, in 1835.  John's father, the extraordinary Sir William Herschel, owned one of the world's largest in the 18th century.  It was 48" in diameter, and a monster for its time.  As a matter of fact in the first month or so of the announcement of the invention of photography John built his own camera and made a daguerreotype of his father's instrument.  In one of the few true bits of the story, John Herschel's telescope was famously located at the Cape of Good Hope (John having moved his family and his 20' scope their in 1833). 

The imaginary telescope wouldn’t  be the largest in the world, now, though—the Keck instruments in Hawaii (at 10 meters) and the Gran Telescopio Canarias (10.4 meters in the Canaries) would dwarf the unimaginably huge fictional creation of 1835.  The extraordinary price, too-an unreachable amount, actually, in 1835—would’ve been about a huge amount today as well:  the adjusted for CPI figure for $3000,000 1835 dollars would be around $7 billion 2008 dollars.  A lot, of course, but not an order of magnitude more, I think, than the cost of these things, and certainly not an impossible-to-imagine amount as the Sir John fictional scope. (It seems to me that the Anglo-Australian telescope named for John Herschel  with first light in 1987 cost 25 millions dollars.)

On a different route altogether is the Mirror Man, who in some aspects is a blank person because he mirrors everything that is placed before him, a parable-like tabula rasa, writ on again and again.  (The legend reads “Habit de Marchland Miroitier Lunettier” by Nicolas de Larmessin III (1640-1725).  (This image was surfaced in Barbara Stafford and Frances Terpak’s Devices of Wonder, from the World in a Box to Images on a Screen, The Getty, 2002, page 258.)   The history of the mirror is really pretty interesting, and even by the time that this engraving was made the mirror was still an uncommon object--more so in the hands of the common folk.  (I wonder when it was that the majority of the working classes in the United States were able to have a good, long look at themselves in their own mirror at home?  When did most people in the U.S. have the luxury of being able to see themselves, in private, whenever they wanted too?  Like, when could they look at their own teeth in private?  Or see themselves naked?  My guess is that it is between 1800-1850.)

Crazy-Insane Eyes Selling Mercedes, 1924. Bad Ideas #22

JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 182

I must say that when I first saw this advertisement for Mercedes (1924?) that I couldn't really remember seeing someone looking this crazy trying to sell something, to anyone.  Then I wondered about insane/laser eyes in general, and couldn't come up much there, either.  Barney Google certainly had "goo goo gooly eyes" but they weren't necessarily crazy/insane.

Superman on the other hand did have laser eyes, and sometimes he was (made to be) crazy--still not quite up to the Mercedes guy, and he wasn't trying to sell anything but himself and the comic that he was in.   I think that the Mercedes Man might be in his own category, and I'm not so sure how successful this ad campaign could've been, especially in the Weimar/Schacht era in hyper-inflated Germany. 

The Geometry of American Western Expansion: Lines in the Sand, Lines in the Air

JF Ptak Science Books LLC   Post 181

The story of the West getting filled up in the 1870s and 1880's is a story of lines—railroad track, telegraph wires, barbed wire fences, and words on a page; big changes from disparate but related areas in technology and legislation, but when you looked at them from a distance and in the proper perspective, they all looked exactly  the same.

The greatest of these was probably the invention of barbed wire in 1873, with Joseph Glidden, Jacob Haish and Isaac Elwood all managing to independently come upon the idea at about the same time.  What barbed wire brought to the West was control and settlement.  Prior to barbed wire there was open range grazing of cattle and extensive cattle drives, mainly because there was no fencing. There were also few farms due to this sort of grazing—the only thing a farm was here was in the way, and there was no recourse for the farmer to protect his lands from a grazing herd.  There was no fencing because there were no materials for the fence.  Fencing was made almost entirely with lumber and stone, and on the treeless plains and the vast non-New England tracts of land, it was simply an impossible task.  The introduction of barbed wire changed all of this very quickly, with thousands of miles of new fencing strung in the 1870’s alone.  Fencing meant control, restriction of the use of land, of access to water, and to a way of life.  It also meant that the farmer was now free to make a claim at a way of life on the plains, beginning a torrent of settlement and farms.

Settlement was enormously aided in this period by three major acts of legislation over a sixteen year period, the first of which was the Homestead Act of 1862. This was a revolutionary concept, legislated in 1358 words, effectively turning over 270 million acres, or about 8 percent of the country, of public lands to private citizens (“actual settlers of the public domain”).  A claim could be made for a farm of 160 acres, for free, provided a structure was built on the land and it was maintained for five years.  One could buy the parcel outright for $1.25 an acre as well.   The Desert Land Act of 1877 opened drier lands, selling 640 acres at $1.25 an acre with three years to pay, so long as the land was irrigated by the end of the three years.  Land that was deemed "unfit for farming" was sold to those who might want to "timber and stone" (logging and mining) upon the land with the Timber and Land Act of 1878. The act was used by speculators who were able to get great expanses declared "unfit for farming" allowing them to increase their land holdings at minimal expense.  The Homestead Act alone accounted for the creation of almost 400,000 farms in the West by 1890.

Settlement was dramatically increased by the promise of mineral wealth—not necessarily just by the introduction of miners, but by securing the lands from and removing its Indian owners.  The Custer expedition into the Black Hills in 1873, for example, reported some hope for finding gold in the sacred mountains of the Sioux. Thousands of miners responded to possibility of wealth, and Custer was again dispatched to secure safety for them in the restricted lands.  This in turn lead to more settlers and coincidentally to the debacle of the Little Big Horn, which was the beginning of the end of the Siouian control over vast amounts of land.  From prospectors to protection to conflict, ultimately making land more available for more people. 

The spread of the railroads was also an enormous settlement factor, with the number of miles of track being laid in Texas and the Great Plains doubling in just 5 years.  Not only could you get West more easily, and quickly, and with less pain and suffering, but you could also be much more easily re-supplied.  Telegraph wires tripled, making it easier to control events:  and this means from being able to respond to Indian attacks more quickly to ordering boxes of nails, or beer, or shipments of newly-invented canned food.