Atomic Bomb--the Cautionary Letters of Einstein and Szilard, 1939-1945

JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 189

Einstein's Letters of 1939 and 1945; Szilard's Petition of 1945; Groves' Letter to Cherwell Looking for Dirt on Szilard 1945; Cherwell's Unusual Response, 1945

AND

JR Oppenheimer signs off on the military use of the bomb

There were certainly a number of cautionary flags waved at the Executive Branch in the period just before the atomic bomb was first used against a Japanese target.  As I wrote in an earlier post here, Dwight Eisenhower was adamantly opposed to the use of the bomb on a city, preferring an example to be made of the thing on an unpopulated area; in his memoirs, General Spaatz (who had received the only written communication authorizing the use of the bomb) was privately against using the weapon on a city. As early as 1939 Albert Einstein famously communicated with Franklin Roosevelt his concerns on the possibility of the terrifying nature of a bomb produced by the efforts (of Fermi and Szilard and many others).  In all Einstein wrote four letters to the President, the first and fourth of which we reproduce here.

The First Einstein Letter to Roosevelt, 1939

                                                                                                   

Einstein's (Fourth) letter to Franklin Roosevelt, introducing Leo Szilard (with his letter following, below):

Albert Einstein
112 Mercer Street
Princeton, New Jersey

March 25, 1945

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I am writing you to introduce Dr. L. Szilard who proposes to submit to you certain considerations and recommendations. Unusual circumstances which I shall describe further below induce me to take this action in spite of the fact that I do not know the substance of the considerations and recommendations which Dr. Szilard proposes to submit to you.

In the summer of 1939 Dr. Szilard put before me his views concerning the potential importance of uranium for national defense. He was greatly disturbed by the potentialities involved and anxious that the United States Government be advised of them as soon as possible. Dr. Szilard, who is one of the discovers of the neutron emission of uranium on which all present work on uranium is based, described to me a specific system which he devised and which he thought would make it possible to set up a chain reaction in unseparated uranium in the immediate future. Having known him for over twenty years both for his scientific work and personally, I have much confidence in his judgment and it was on the basis of his judgment as well as my own that I took the liberty to approach you in connection with this subject. You responded to my letter dated August 2, 1939 by the appointment of a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Briggs and thus started the Government's activity in this field.

The terms of secrecy under which Dr. Szilard is working at present do not permit him to give me information about his work; however, I understand that he now is greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy. In the circumstances I consider it my duty to give Dr. Szilard this introduction and I wish to express the hope that you will be able to give his presentation of the case your personal attention.
(Signed A. Eisntein)

The Leo Szilard Petition, with the full text below:

On July 17, 1945, Leo Szilard and 69 co-signers at the Manhattan Project Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago signed a petition (written by Szilard) to President Roosevelt, calling on the powers that be to reconsider using the bomb against a city target  not only on moral grounds but also as a template for what the near-future would bring so far as the proliferation of the bomb was concerned.  It seems that they were saying that the use of the bomb in July 1945 would make it more plausible for the use of far more destructive bombs in the coming years. ("If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation.")  They continued "All the resources of the United States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation. Its prevention is at present the solemn responsibility of the United States -- singled out by virtue of her lead in the field of atomic power...", certainly warning the President of the pandora aspect of the employment of Fat Man

In general the group was against using the weapon--except if it were absolutely necessary "(in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs"): "...then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step, however, ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved." This is the tricky spot, the balancing point, of the entire discussion on whether to drop the bomb--was using the bomb, (in "certain circumstances") a necessity?

General Groves, the military man in charge of Los Alamos, was hugely annoyed, piss-and-vinegar upset with Szilard over this communication--outraged that Szilard, in his mind, had broken security measures to communicate his concerns with the President.  Groves sought out Lord Cherwell  to do some dirt-digging on Szilard, looking for ways of dealing with his "insubordination".

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 1 PAGE(S)
NO. 3 OF 3 COPIES, SERIES A

                                         4 July 1945
The Right Honorable
The Lord Cherwell
War Cabinet Offices
London, England

Dear Lord Cherwell,

I wonder if it would be taxing your memory unduly if I were to ask
you to write me briefly the subjects of your discussion in your
meeting with Dr. Leo Szilard in May of 1943, when you were in this
country.

Dr. Szilard, as you will recall, worked in the Clarendon Laboratory
during the years 1935 to 1938.

Frankly, Dr. Szilard has not, in our opinion, evidenced wholehearted
cooperation in the maintenance of security.

In order to prevent any unjustified action, I am examining all of
the facts which can be collected on Dr. Szilard and I am therefore
seeking your assistance.

I am looking forward to the day when I will be able to see you again.

                                           Sincerely yours,

                                           L. R. GROVES
                                           Major General, USA

Cherwel's response to groves was very interesting--he included with it a Top Secret document recounting his overall impressions of Szilard (in regards to a security detriment) which is below.  As you can see Cherwell's own recllection from 1943 would provide no fuel for Grove's fire--Szilard was meticulous on these points, choosing his words wisely (he was, after all, a genius).  The only thing that Cherwell could actually say against Szilard was that he kept harking back to his general anxiety about the future of the world".  Indeed!

  SECRET
                        TOP SECRET

PAYMASTER GENERAL                        GREAT GEORGE STREET,
                                                       S.W.1


    CONVERSATION WITH DR. SZILARD, MAY 1943, WASHINGTON D.C.

When I spoke to Szilard in Washington in 1943, he was, so far as I
can remember, mainly concerned with a topic which has inflamed so
many scientists' minds, namely what sort of arrangements could be
made to prevent an arms race with all the disastrous consequences to
which this would lead. I do not recall that he offered any solution,
although when we had discussed the same matter in Oxford before the
war he had advocated some agreement between scientists not to lend
themselves to any application of nuclear chain reactions to lethal
purposes.

My impression is that his security was good to the point of
brusqueness. He did, I believe, complain that compartmentalism was
carried to undue lengths in America, but on the other hand, when I
asked him about some point - I forget what - deriving from our work
in Oxford he replied that he was not at liberty to discuss it as he
had passed into the employment of the American Government. We did
not, so far as I can recollect, have any further conversation on
technical processes, but he kept harking back to his general anxiety
about the future of the world.

                                            Cherwell   

Oppenheimer

Finally for this installment is the recommendation by JR Oppenheimer on the military use of the bomb ("we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."), a text transcript of the document as follows:

Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, by the Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee on Nuclear Power, June 16, 1945. Source: U. S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, Harrison-Bundy File, Folder #76.

TOP SECRET
THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec Army By TAG per 720564
THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGE(S)
NO. 1 OF 12 COPIES, SERIES A
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE IMMEDIATE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

                        A. H. Compton
                        E. O. Lawrence
                        J. R. Oppenheimer
                        E. Fermi

                                  [signature]
                                  J. R. Oppenheimer
                                  For the Panel

June 16, 1945

You have asked us to comment on the initial use of the new weapon. This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a satisfactory adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war.

(1) To accomplish these ends we recommend that before the weapons are used not only Britain, but also Russia, France, and China be advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on atomic weapons, that these may be ready to use during the present war, and that we would welcome suggestions as to how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations.

(2) The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.

(3) With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power.

Source: U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, Harrison-Bundy File, folder #76.
On July 17, 1945, Leo Szilard and 69 co-signers at the Manhattan Project "Metallurgical Laboratory" in Chicago petitioned the President of the United States.

The text of the Petition, as follows:

Discoveries of which the people of the United States are not aware may affect the welfare of this nation in the near future. The liberation of atomic power which has been achieved places atomic bombs in the hands of the Army. It places in your hands, as Commander-in-Chief, the fateful decision whether or not to sanction the use of such bombs in the present phase of the war against Japan.

We, the undersigned scientists, have been working in the field of atomic power. Until recently, we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today, with the defeat of Germany, this danger is averted and we feel impelled to say what follows:

The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and attacks by atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare. We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender.

If such public announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look forward to a life devoted to peaceful pursuits in their homeland and if Japan still refused to surrender our nation might then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step, however, ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved.

The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.

If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation. All the resources of the United States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation. Its prevention is at present the solemn responsibility of the United States -- singled out by virtue of her lead in the field of atomic power.

The added material strength which this lead gives to the United States brings with it the obligation of restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral position would be weakened in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes. It would then be more difficult for us to live up to our responsibility of bringing the unloosened forces of destruction under control.

In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition: first, that you exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief, to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use atomic bombs be decided by you in light of the considerations presented in this petition as well as all the other moral responsibilities which are involved

Comments

[Jim McDosh]

Wow, that was one smart dude. He carried that fact in his grammar alone.

JT
www.FireMe.To/udi

[Peter Pitchford]

I went to the Franklin House/Museum in Hyde Park, NY to see Einstein's Letter to Roosevelt warning about the bomb. To my surprise, it was not in any of the exhibits. I asked one of the guides where it was and they said it was in an archive in the basement where the public is not allowed.

I was very disappointed. I think its one of the most significant documents ever written.

As Einstien said, "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe."

You can see the most importand issues of the atomic age laid out in this letter.
The entire world geopolitical stage is still dominated by the same nuclear threat or rumors of nuclear threats, which are still being manipulated to take advantage of the ignorant.

General Groves manipulated Truman into using the bomb by dishonestly exaggerating how soon the The Soviet Union would have it, and the very same game was played by President Bush to panic the United States into its illegal occupation of Iraq.

[bigwinner]

"We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender."

I always wondered what would have happened if this alternate route had been taken. Oh well, I suppose the counterfactual historians will debate that one forever.

[John Ptak]

Thanks for your comment, Peter Pitchford. Although fear manipulation was a factor in both the use of the atomic bomb and the second attack on Iraq, I feel that the fear was far more justified in the former case (a-bomb) as an actual and existing threat, while the basis for fear in the second case (Iraq) largely if not entirely a set of created "facts" having little or nothing to do with reality. It is a very difficult thing to do, putting oneself in the continuum of decision making in those weeks in 1945, and deeply complex. I appreciate your thoughtful input.

[Steve Fakeman]

"We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender."

If I recall correctly, after the first atomic bomb was dropped, the Japanese were offered an opportunity to surrender. They declined, allegedly because they thought the US didn't have another atomic bomb. The second bomb was dropped, and then they surrendered.

I hate to play the "what if" alternate history game, but if the Japanese refused to surrender after being nuked once and seeing the full effect of a nuclear bomb, what are the odds that they would have surrendered merely to the threat of this mysterious, new weapon. Almost zero. They didn't believe we were capable of making a bomb like that once, then when they were nuked, they didn't think we could make a second one.

Does that justify the use of the bomb? I don't intend for my comments to be construed as justifying the use of the bomb, just an answer to the hypothetical question put forth in a previous post.

[John Ptak]

Thanks Steve Fakeman. I think that it is not often remembered that Japan didn't immediately surrender after the very recent Tokyo raid, nor after Hiroshima, nor after Nagasaki. They did surrender on the 12th, 3 days following the Nagasaki bomb. (The Japanese offered to surrender on the 10th, with provisions, the document being accepted on the 12th.) A third bomb was already at Tinian by the 12th, and basically ready to go.

[Kent Myers]

Jim McDosh quotes Einstein, "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." But what is the exact citation? And can I bank on this being the precise wording? I have three versions of this one. One of them is surely correct, but there is a minor literature of highly degraded versions, and I wanted to make some comments on why the degraded versions are so popular, and what they miss from the original. So you see, I need to have the original. Can anybody help me?

[Peter Pitchford]

It was me, not Jim McDosh, who quoted Einstein. The quote was in a telegram to Prominent Americans. For a fee, you can find the original article about the telegram here:
"ATOMIC EDUCATION URGED BY EINSTEIN: Scientists in Plea for $200,000 to Promote New Type of Essential Thinking."
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50C14F6345413738DDDAC0A94DD405B8688F1D3

The article, including the text of the telegram can also be found for free here: http://www.turnthetide.info/id54.htm

The original document is probably in the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists Records in the Special Collections Research Center at the University of Chicago Library
http://ead.lib.uchicago.edu/view.xqy?id=ICU.SPCL.ECAS&c=e&sub=Emergency%20Committee%20of%20Atomic%20Scientists

John Ptak: There is no question that the Soviets were a threat. However, the threat of a Soviet Bomb was exagerated in that it was not immediate. I am certain that if Truman did not believe the threat of a Soviet Bomb was not an immediate threat, he would not have used it. And it was in fact NOT an immediate threat. Even if it were, that is not a rational reason to use the bomb on Japan.

What others are missing is that the bomb's intended effect was not to get Japan to surrender. They knew Japan was about to surrender and they wanted to hurry up and use it BEFORE they surrendered. Read the definitive book, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" by Gar Alperovitz". Most historians agree with this point of view.

The idea that Japan had an opportunity to surrender but didn't after 2 days is ridiculous, because if you read the history, they were trying to surrender but were being ignored. General Groves knew it, but he wanted to drop the other bomb anyway. As I stated before, General Groves controlled the situation by lying to the president about the need to put on a show for the Soviets.