This small archive—from the estate of J.D. Coker, who served in the U.S. Navy on the US Strategic Bombing Survey Ships' Bombardment section, and who later became a leading official in the U.S. Atomic Preparedness programs (such as the President's Committee on Emergency Preparedness)—are mimeographs and manuscripts that comprise what seems to be the summary of the Navy's bombardment of Kamaishi, Muroran, Hitachi, Kushimoto, Shimizu and Hamamatsu. This was about the extent of the Allied naval bombardments against Japan, as it was not possible for battleships to maneuver close enough to the Japanese homeland to fire against industrial and production centers. (It may have also been the case that the aircraft used to protect the assaulting ships could have perhaps done as much damage to the targets as the ships themselves.)
The archive includes:
The following quotes are all taken from a Wiki article on the ships' bombardment survey:
“On 1 July 1945, the U.S 3rd Fleet sortied from Leyte Gulf in the Philippines under the command of Admiral William Halsey to attack the Japanese Home Islands. Halsey's plans included the use of battleships and cruisers to bombard military facilities and factories, and in preparation for these attacks U.S. Navy submarines sailed into inshore waters to search for naval mines. United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-29 Superfortress and B-24 Liberators also conducted photo reconnaissance flights over much of Japan in search of airfields and facilities which could be attacked by the Third Fleet.”
[Major Allied naval air attacks and bombardments of targets in Japan in July-August 1945]
“On the night of 14/15 July, another bombardment unit — TU 34.8.2 — was detached from TF 38 to attack the town of Muroran on the south-east coast of Hokkaido. TU 34.8.2 comprised the battleships USS Iowa, Missouri and Wisconsin, light cruisers USS Atlanta and Dayton as well as eight destroyers and was commanded by Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger. Admiral Halsey accompanied this force onboard Missouri.The targets of this attack were the Japan Steel Company's facility and the Wanishi Iron Works. That night, a force of four cruisers and six destroyers also sailed near the east coast of Honshu to attack Japanese shipping but did not locate any targets."
“The attacks on Hokkaido and northern Honshu ended on 15 July, and TF 38 sailed away from the Japanese coast to refuel and rendezvous with the main body of the British Pacific Fleet, which was designated Task Force 37 (TF 37). On the morning of 17 July, the British and U.S. carriers attacked targets to the north of Tokyo. Later that day, TU 34.8.2 and the British battleship HMS King George V and her two escorting destroyers detached from the carrier force to bombard targets around the city of Hitachi, which is located about 80 mi (130 km) northeast of Tokyo. This force was commanded by Rear Admiral Badger and comprised the battleships Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Alabama and HMS King George V, light cruisers Atlanta and Dayton and eight U.S. and two British destroyers. King George V and her two escorts sailed astern of the U.S. force but operated independently. Halsey again accompanied this force on board.”
Nojima Saki and Shionomisaki
"On 18 July, TFs 37 and 38 conducted further air strikes in the Tokyo area, with the U.S. Navy's main effort being an attempt to sink the Japanese battleship Nagato in Yokosuka Naval Base. That night, Cruiser Division 18 (CruDiv 18), which comprised the light cruisers USS Topeka, Oklahoma City , Atlanta and Dayton under the command of Rear Admiral Carl F. Holden, USN, and DesRon 62 Captain John M.Higgins commanding, steaming as Task Group 35.4 made an anti-shipping sweep across the entrance of Sagama-nada into Tokyo Bay. No shipping was found and a target of opportunity was engaged. The cruisers opened fire at 2352 at radar installations firing 240 6 in (150 mm) main battery projectiles on Cape Nojima in a five-minute period at a range of approximately 5,000 yards. "One large explosion was seen but complete report on the effect of gunfire was not immediately available." Incorrect reference to this action is contained in Morison (1960), pp. 313 and 316. This correction was submitted by a former main battery turret officer aboard the Atlanta.”
“On 29 July, a group of warships was detached from the main body of the Allied fleet to bombard the city of Hamamatsu. This force comprised the same ships which had attacked Kamaishi on 14 July with the addition of HMS King George V and the destroyers HMS Ulysses, Undine and Urania; the four British ships were designated Task Unit 37.1.2 (TU 37.1.2). The city had previously suffered extensive damage from air attacks.”
“The next bombardment of Japan took place on the night of 30/31 July. On that night Destroyer Squadron 25 (DesRon 25), which was commanded by Captain J.W. Ludewig aboard USS John Rodgers, swept Suruga Gulf looking for Japanese shipping to attack. No Japanese ships were located, however, and in the early hours of 31 July the squadron sailed deep into the gulf and fired 1,100 rounds of 5 in (130 mm) shells in seven minutes at a railway yard and aluminium plant in the town of Shimizu. While the aluminium plant was hit, this was of little importance as it had almost ceased production due to a shortage of raw materials. No damage was caused to the rail yard.
During the last days of July and into early August, the Allied fleet sailed away from the Japanese coast to avoid a typhoon and allow the ships to replenish their stocks of fuel and ammunition. Following this the fleet sailed north, and on both 9 and 10 August the carrier aircraft attacked a large concentration of Japanese aircraft on airfields in northern Honshu. The carrier pilots claimed to have destroyed 720 Japanese aircraft in this operation.”